Three hypotheses exist for the bimodal, cross-country, income distributions emerging in the data since 1960 and dubbed convergence clubs. One is that economies in each mode are interacting with one another -true clubs. A second is that the bimodality is caused by lock-in or 'true contagion' -success at innovations breeds further success, failure breeds failure. These are false clubs because no interaction is assumed. A third (ours) generates false clubs but with no lock-in (false contagion), in a model with two stochastic processes, one from the consumer side, the other the usual Poisson process for innovations. Monte Carlo simulations show that bimodals can be caused by effects from either side. With non-conformist consumers for example, as R&D productivity is varied from increasing to decreasing returns, the bimodal distribution can move to an almost normal curve, with both few rich and few poor economies. All the derived Markov transition matrices mimic the dominant diagonals of the post-1960 data so that these are no proof of either clubs or lock-in.
Introduction
Three theories have been proposed for the bimodal, cross-country, income distributions emerging in the data since 1960, and discovered by Quah [1993] . The economies in the two modes have been dubbed convergence clubs, one rich, the other poor. The first, by Quah himself [1997] , is that the economies in each mode are interacting with one another -true clubs. A second, by Solow [1997] , is that the bimodality is caused by a form of lock-in; success at innovation breeds further success, failure breeds failure. W. Feller [1943] called this process 'true contagion' because it is a feature of epidemics. Solow's modes are false clubs because there is no assumed interaction. A third, by De Castro [1999] , is shown here to generate false clubs with no 2 lock-in (false contagion), with the introduction of a second stochastic process into the Aghion and Howitt [1992] framework, from the consumer side, and called consumerculture resistance to creative destruction.
In this paper, we develop an algorithm for De Castro´s model which can execute Monte Carlo simulations to count the number of innovations occurring over a 200 year interval. Since the size of each innovation, measured by the increase in GDP per head it causes, is exogenous, the histograms for innovations are equivalent to world income distributions, if we assume that economies all begin their growth histories at the same time, say 1800, and the same per capita income. These are taken to be stylized facts, probably more fact than stylized according to Bairoch [1993] .
When R&D productivity has increasing returns in a sense to be defined, bimodality always occurs independently of the type of consumer behavior assumed.
With decreasing returns, bimodality appears only with conformist consumers. The notion of a consumer culture will be formalized in Section 1, but it is important to state now that while we introduce heterogeneity across consumers, no fundamental diversity across economies is assumed. Thus, while the result allows us to say that if R&D is intrinsically an activity with decreasing returns, then bimodality would be mainly a culturally determined result, this claim would not mean that it is cultural differences which cause poverty or riches, since here all economies are identically endowed. It is the world's culture, human behavior, and not that of any identifiable subset of economies which would cause the bimodality.
An even more dramatic illustration of this property of the model is another result that if consumers are non-conformist, then diminishing returns to R&D would cause the world distribution to become an almost normal curve, with most economies clustered symmetrically around the mean-mode ( see figure 9 ).
In the stochastic literature, De Castro´s model would be called a mixed Poisson process because the Poisson parameter (λ) is itself a random variable drawn repeatedly from a stationary distribution (see Grandell [1997] ). The second stochastic process causes a change in the value of λ, the mean arrival rate of innovations, each time one occurs. Innovations create a sequence of new goods which a random fraction (c) of the consumers chooses each time whether to acquire or to remain with the old or traditional good. The larger the fraction, the greater is the incentive for R&D so that at each arrival, λ changes in a way dependent on this fraction. If λ is a constant, common to all 3 economies, our histograms would be all Poisson distributions, which do not exhibit bimodality.
There is heterogeneity across consumers, but not across economies which do not interact in any way after growth begins. The only assumption is that at start-up, every economy is identical and they all know how to grow. Basically, this means they all have the same income per person and some random initial fraction of the labor force doing research. When bimodality does occur, the economies which find themselves in the group forming the rich mode are not clubs. They are simply the ones which have had more innovations. There is no lock-in either, in the sense that the probability of arrival of an innovation does not depend in any way on the history of previous occurrences. In fact, the result says that this world distribution can be caused by the same average behavior across economies -half the consumers are assumed, on average, to switch to the new good at each innovation.
The economic explanation of the bimodal results is that the increasing returns, R&D productivity amplifies the effect on λ of events with large fractions of consumers choosing the new good, which induces high temporary research levels. This causes asymmetrically more countries to become rich than to become middle-income. With decreasing returns R&D, these large fraction events do not increase λ as much. Hence the bimodality has to have been induced by their higher frequency. Conformist consumers tend to act in unison so that almost all will simultaneously accept or reject the new good. This behavior loads most of the mass of the probability density function of the switching fraction, c, at its two ends.
An alternative theory which can also generate bimodal distributions with no interactions among economies is Solow´s [1997] . He superposed Aghion & Howitt´s random innovations on an Arrow-type, learning by doing production function.
However, for each economy in each period, the probability of an innovation is made to depend on its history of innovations. Specifically, in each period, if an innovation had occurred in the previous one, the probability of success is increased by a factor. If not, it is reduced. As he magnified the feedback factor, there is a dramatic thinning out of the middle-income group in his simulated distributions.
In Solow´s results, the learning by doing effect is swamped by the stochastics of the innovation process. Further, the exogenous feedback of each economy's history into its chances of success in each period generates almost symmetrical, bimodal distributions, one mode rich, the other poor. This is a form of lock-in, even though 4 neither state is absorbing, because the probability of a poor economy succeeding at an innovation would have become many times smaller than that of a rich one.
In the statistics literature, it was W. Feller [1943] who first proved the general result that the two very different types of process could generate the same kind of distribution. With one type each "favorable" event, an innovation, increases (or decreases) the probability of future favorable events. This is Solow´s theory. With the second type, the events are, strictly speaking, independent and the "apparent" contagion is actually due to an inhomogeneity of the population (of economies).
Our theory is a version of this type, false contagion, but the inhomogeneity is not due to any structural feature of certain individual economies. The Poisson parameter λ is obtained by repeated random draws from a distribution which is the same for all economies. To see the argument, take an opposite, extreme version of this type. Suppose there were only 2 possible values of λ, λ 1 >>λ 2 . At the start-up of the growth process 200 years ago, each economy takes a draw of λ and stays with it for all time, each generating a sequence of innovations using its λ in a simple Poisson process. Here, the inhomogeneity is structural. Some economies in the population have inherited a high-productivity innovation mechanism while others have not. This is a possible fourth hypothesis for the bimodality.
Feller was not very helpful about how to set up statistical tests of the phenomena other than to say that "a detailed study of the correlation between various time intervals is necessary" (p. 398) but there is some recent literature in actuarial journals. The full data set is not available, meaning a complete annual time series of income per head of every economy since start-up around 1800, but they can be interpolated where gaps exist. Most of the recent econometric work is on the post-war data, which in many ways are not representative. One example is how the western European economies closed the gap with the US which had opened in the first half of the 20 th century. Another is how backward, southern European economies caught up with the north and hence also with the US in the second half. To take a case, Spain's income per head in 1950 was probably less than it was at the beginning of the century.
The econometric work has mostly produced correlation between growth and structural economic variables like education levels and saving rates. It is our view that they probably represent causality from growth to the structure. Bils and Klenow [1998] , 5 for example, have some results which indicate it is growth which most likely causes the increases in education levels and not the other way around.
The structural variables which cause growth are, in our view, not yet easy to identify much less measure. Some economists also believe they may well have long lags. We think this unlikely, though we hedge our bets by claiming that while the underlying socio-political variables may well have them, once the causal event occurs, then growth or decline will follow quickly, with the consequent, correlated economic variables -education, saving, migration etc. Here the causal event, an innovation, is endogenous and the GDP increment is instantaneous and permanent. This is the reverse of the research method of the real business cycle literature. There the causal events, innovations, are exogenous and the resulting income cycles endogenously around its new, permanent, potential level.
In our model, individual incomes within each economy are always perfectly equal. All the divergence is across economies. The first is counter-factual. There is much empirical evidence to indicate a paradox in the data -as the world distribution diverges, there appears to be a tendency to convergence of individual incomes in each economy when its average income rises above a certain level. That is, individual incomes become more equal as each country's average income rises, but average incomes across countries become less equal as the world's average income rises. This is a strong indication that the within-country dynamic is different from the world dynamic.
If we ignore countries and look at the world distribution of individual incomes, we would see only divergence. If it is the economy's government which causes individual incomes to converge when its average grows, then the policy implication for more equality across nations may well be world government.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 1 outlines the growth model.
The next two explains how it measures GDP and the algorithm used to solve it. The results are in section 4 and the last gives the conclusions. A second stochastic process is then introduced, from the consumer side. The true engine of growth in this economy becomes the predilection to switch to new goods, of a randomly varying fraction of its consumers. The stochastic process which determines the fraction of agents who switch at each discovery is called a recruitment mechanism, taken from Kirman [1993] , and is meant, in this equilibrium version of the theory, to be bereft of any special economic incentives. New goods here are simply faddish or fashionable versions of the traditional good which yield monopoly profits while the fad survives.
Section 1. The economic growth model
In either sector, the consumer-worker exchanges one unit of labor for one unit of the good he produces. New goods, however, are assumed to have an increasing returns to labor (irl) technology so that each current monopolist can pay the one-for-one wage and still leave a surplus. But the capital market is perfect so that all the super-profits of each new good finances the search for the next one and leaves nothing for its monopolist, in a manner similar to Aghion & Howitt's. With these assumptions, the bigger the fraction of switchers, the greater is the research effort (see Figure 1) .
In an earlier attempt at introducing consumer resistance into the Aghion & Howitt framework, De Castro [1993] induced the innovations to form a queue while waiting for consumer approval. This second stochastic process slowed the average growth rate but the equilibrium distribution remained a simple Poisson. However, when the laissez-faire growth rate is too fast for social efficiency, this demand-side resistance can increase welfare.
Section 1.1 The social recruitment process to the two sectors
At the discovery of each new good, we assume that a random fraction of the primary agents, consumer-workers, will decide on which good they will want to 7 consume, and to simplify matters, the sector in which to locate. This fraction, c t ∈
[0,1], when the t th new good is discovered, is a stochastic variable determined by a process of recruitment which Kirman [1993] developed from biological studies of ants and showed how it related to three examples of market behavior. The process yields, in the long run, a symmetrical Beta distribution for c t . However, as is well known, such a Beta can be unimodal, U-shaped or even uniform. We state now the behavioral theory behind it.
Basically, the process is a social one of communication and persuasion among primary agents, about which sector they will choose when the next discovery occurs and is implemented. It is intended to represent a choice between two almost equally rewarding activities. That is, the explicit economic incentives behind the decision to choose one or the other sector must be equitable in some sense. This language is intentionally imprecise because we are trying to represent heterogeneous agents faced with a choice between the known, the perfectly competitive, neoclassical sector, and the relatively unknown, namely to consume a new good and either to produce it or to help search for the next one. It is the notion of an economic equilibrium, but without the explicit optimizations of the usual theory. Paul Romer [1994] is eloquent on the havoc new goods wreck with pricing theories in competitive general equilibrium.
Although the analogy may make some of us a little uneasy, let us take a brief look at the behavior of the ants which had helped Kirman to see the economics. In many situations observed both in the laboratory and outside, colonies of ants have been known to choose between two equally endowed food sources, in a random pattern with a specific characteristic. They tended to feed almost all together for sustained intervals, consistently at mainly one source and then suddenly, again almost together, to switch to the second source. That is, they hardly ever spent time on outcomes in which the group is roughly equally split between the two sources. Put another way, although each ant divided his feeding time roughly equally between the two sources, this division was always correlated with the others, even though there was no apparent incentive so to act.
In the language of economics, the coordinated behavior had no rewards such as scale economies, or positive externalities in production or consumption as in network goods.
We shall call consumers who behave in this way conformist.
Neither Kirman nor De Castro claimed that, to put it crudely, people act like ants. Two defenses will belie any such claim. Firstly, it is only in the specification 8 below of elitist or mass preferences, that the idea that some consumers' preferences are influenced by the consumption of others will be introduced. Its origins are from Akerlof [1980] who, as far as we know, spends his time observing humans. Secondly, and more compellingly, Kirman's formal model allows other types of behavior than the one observed for ants. For example, only the Beta distribution with a U-shape coincides with their behavior, where the probability mass is concentrated at the two extremes, near zero and near 1. All three types of symmetrical Betas are used in the simulations.
This work is closely related to the more general urn models studied by Arthur et al [1985] .
Once the shape of the equilibrium distribution for switches is assumed, it is used to make draws of c t , the fraction of primary agents who, at discovery of new good t, opt to locate in the new-good sector. The only prices used are the one-for-one exchange available in either sector. However, it is implicitly assumed that any experience by an agent of time spent in the past in any previous new-good sectors, will not change the probability measure of his powers of persuasion, and thus the dynamic of opinion formation about future new goods. The social recruitment process to the two sectors must remain compatible with the stationary price system in the equilibrium. This may be a kind of herd assumption since the one-for-one price is immune to the changing switching fractions (see Banerjee[1992] ).
The basic model outlined so far is the one we have implemented in the computer work. However, it shares with the literature the flaw pointed out by Charles Jones [1995] , namely that the average growth rate of our economies, derived from the number of innovations occurring, is correlated with the average size of the R&D labor allocations. De Castro [1999] showed a method for breaking this correlation by introducing three possible types of consumer preferences -elitist, mass and middleclass. Only the elitist and mass types can break it. In the simulations so far, the middleclass preferences were used but for completeness, we outline the basic idea in the next sub-section.
Section 1.2 Consumer preferences -elitist, mass or middle-class
The recruitment process decides the fraction c t of agents who will choose to locate in the new-good sector at each innovation,t. This fraction in turn determines the R&D allocation, z t . All new goods go into production because all are viable at the going 9 one-for-one trades. Suppose however that the world's consumers are elitist, meaning that if too many agents were to consume the new good, its price would fall and it may not be able to cover its variable costs. Put another way, consumer-workers may be unwilling to accept the going, one-for-one real wage, to produce and consume it. For elitist preferences, De Castro assumed that if c t > 1/2, new good t would not be viable and so never goes into production. Innovation t will thus be lost and it would create no technological spillover to the traditional good sector and so generate growth. Similarly, if the world had mass preferences, innovations would be lost every time c t < 1/2 is drawn. With this terminology, it seemed appropriate to call the preferences in the basic model middle-class, since consumers in this case are assumed to be more willing to accept each new good on its own merit, without reference to whether others are consuming it. This type of preferences is closest to the conception of the microeconomic textbooks in that once prices are known, each consumer decides individually, without concern for the behavior of others (see Figures 2 and 3 ). The fraction 1/2 is arbitrary.
These ideas were inspired directly by mainly the work of Corneo & Jeanne Specifically, being new, the good has no reputation with consumers, and producers must "invest" in a consumption norm in order to create the market for it. This investment, it is claimed, cannot be recouped in an industry which is perfectly competitive because, after paying the normal factors of production, there would be no surplus revenue with which to compensate the investment in the norm. New goods need monopolists.
Their model deals with only one new good in a partial equilibrium framework.
Much simplification was needed to use the idea. With the sequence of new goods here, it was assumed that each new good, on arrival, kills the demand for the previous one.
Secondly, the investment for the creation or discovery of each is done by a competitive research industry as in A&H. Thirdly, for general equilibrium, one needs some 10 feedback into wage rates. And finally, the inter-temporal pricing policies of the monopolist become constrained by the new context.
Section 2. Measuring income growth -the middle class case
An increment in GDP per person, growth, will occur whenever there is a spillover from a currently produced new good to the neoclassical sector. For middleclass preferences, all the discoveries of new goods go into production so that the c t distribution will feed into the full range of research labor allocations, z t ∈ [0 , z m ], which in turn will determine the implicit probability density function (pdf) of λ, the randomly varying, mean arrival rate of innovations in the neoclassical sector. The pdf of the accumulated number of innovations N(Τ) during a given time period, say T=200 years since about 1800, derived from pdf(λ), will be the predicted, current, crosscountry income distribution given by the theory.
Some numbers may help us get a feel for the reasoning. Since the size of each innovation is assumed to be constant and exogenous, let's say each is worth US $500 at The assumed functional relationships among c t , z t and λ are now given:
; t is the new-good and thus the innovation counter.
(i)
The first is due to two assumptions about the new-good sector, one technological the other behavioral. Research labor allocations z t increase with the size of the new-good sector faster than linear, and the monopolists' potential, strategic monopsonic behavior is blocked. The second relationship, between R&D z t and the arrival rate of new goods λ, is common in the literature. The assumed fall in research productivity with scale (ξ<1) is not entirely convincing. In any case, in this application it doesn't matter because what counts is the final relation λ(c t ) which is:
As can be seen, the effect of the research productivity parameter gets merged with that of the switching fraction. When δ ξ > 1, we shall say that R&D has increasing returns to scale even though its effect on λ comes from a composite mix of decreasing returns to R&D and increasing returns in the production of each new good.
Section 3. The algorithm
In order to simulate this stochastic model we take the following steps. We set up 
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We ran six possible combinations of three symmetrical Beta distributions, Ushaped (α=β<1), unimodal (α=β>1) and uniform (α=β=1), and two values of δξ (>1 and <1), increasing and decreasing returns to scale respectively, in R&D.
Section 4 Results

The histograms of the world distributions
The U-shaped Beta distribution for c t , the case of conformist consumers, generates bimodal distributions independently of the returns to scale effect (figs. 4 and 5). The decreasing returns case ( fig.4) shows clearly this bimodality. There, the main cause of the bimodality in the per capita income distribution is the probability mass of c t concentrated at the two extremes of its Beta distribution. However, looking at the next two histograms we can see that even when we use an uniform distribution for c t (figs. 6 and 7), the bimodality can be generated by increasing returns to scale in R&D ( fig.7 ). All our estimated Markov matrices had dominant diagonals, though some were more dominant than others. We give only 2 here (figure 10). For example, some diagonal elements were in the range of just over 0.5. However, since our model has no lock-in, this means that the dominant diagonals of the real world distribution identified by Quah are no indication of this feature. Further, they occurred with both unimodal and bimodal simulated world distributions. We plan further work on these Markov matrices with more formal techniques than the visual inspection employed here.
Section 5. Conclusions
The Monte Carlo simulations reported in this paper showed that despite the same fundamentals for all the economies, the bimodal world income distribution identified by The model is extremely parsimonious. Only two parameters determine the world distribution : the symmetrical Beta distribution parameter for consumers switching to new goods, and the composite, R&D scale effect. In the presence of increasing returns to R&D, the distribution of switchers does not matter -bimodality occurs in all cases.
When there are decreasing returns to R&D, the bimodality appears only with the Ushaped Beta distribution for switchers, that is, with conformist consumers. 
